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A short walk from New York‟s Penn Station stands a larger-than-life replica of a 
needle threading a black button.  Only a few blocks west, students walk through the door 
of the Fashion Institute of Technology‟s David Dubinsky Student Center.  These polished 
images and landmarks of the Garment District‟s past are a far cry from the tumultuous 
decades that shaped this densely-packed urban landscape in the years between the first 
and second World Wars.  It was in this time period that New York‟s Garment District 
emerged as an area that concentrated an array of social forces that crossed paths and 
rubbed shoulders on the bustling streets of Manhattan‟s West Side.   
 Today the Garment Center Synagogue, the Amalgamated Bank on 7
th
 avenue, the 
string of discount textile storefronts that line 35
th
 street, and the aforementioned 
monuments are but a few of the visible signs from the area‟s past.  The history of the 
Garment District serves as an important example of the constantly changing, unfixed 
nature of modern capitalist society. The ascension of American Jews into the middle-
class has been a general condition that has existed for several decades now, and one that 
we has had reinforced in a countless amount of ways through media and culture.  It is in 
this current reality, this conventional norm, that we look back at the years of the 1920s 
into the 1940s, when a majority of people that worked, operated, organized, and at times 
terrorized the Garment District were Eastern European Jews. The economic and social 
strata of Jews within the Garment District during the first half of the 20th century 
represents a long-forgotten, but very real breed of Jews: workers engaged in manual 
labor, communists, and gangsters.  All three of these economic/social strata converged in 
the Garment District to produce a volatile mix that serves as the basis for this thesis.
*
 
                                                 
*
 Shtarker, the title comes from a Yiddish term for a strong person, a tough guy. 
 4 
 The emergence of organized crime, militant union struggles, and the short-lived, 
yet powerful, Communist movement were social forces in history that played a part in 
shaping American society.  A close study of these movements and organizations will 
reveal a profound influence exerted on society that reached beyond their actual size due 
to the position in which they were situated in the American economy.  What was the 
nature of their relationship and what does this particular situation reveal about each 
respective grouping?  The glamorized interpretations of the Jewish gangster operating 
outside the status quo; the street savvy hoodlum who survived by his wits best 
represented in books such as Tough Jews
1
 and films like Once Upon A Time in America 
2
consistently fail to recognize the predatory and reactionary role the Jewish underworld 
played in American history.  The mythologized Robin Hood- bandit figure quickly 
evaporates as soon as one acknowledges their function as strikebreakers, extorters, and in 
many cases, the supra-legal “muscle” for capitalist consolidation.  The numerous shifts in 
political leadership, factional disputes, and ideological transformations have produced a 
complex, uneven terrain to investigate.  However, throughout all the twists and turns one 
is still able to discern a Marxist movement that worked closest with organized crime 
figures when they put practicalities over politics and the short-term interests of a 
stabilized industry over the long-term goals of radical transformation and liberation.   
Clearly the history of labor racketeering stretches much longer in time and 
broader in scope than simply New York‟s garment industry during the interwar period.  
However, the years that constitute this paper‟s focus are marked by several distinctive 
characteristics: (1) this was the first time when organized crime integrated itself into a 
                                                 
1
 Rich Cohen, Tough Jews: Fathers, Sons, and Gangster Dreams (New York: Vintage, 1999) 
2
 Once Upon A Time In America, dir. Sergio Leone (1984; Embassy Pictures) 
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specific industry in a systematic way, thus producing a certain „initial chaos‟ not to be 
found in the soon to become routinized, unspoken agreements between union leaders and 
labor racketeers, (2) the existence and active role of a communist party that tended to be 
more ideological and more radical than the average trade-unionist, and (3) the relative 
autonomy and freedom of organized crime to operate within legitimate businesses due to 
J. Edgar Hoover‟s denial of a national crime syndicate and the absence of acts such as 
RICO ( Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act). 
 The term garment industry will be utilized in this paper to encompass the four 
main industries of: women‟s wear, men‟s wear, fur and leather, and millinery hats.  The 
unions represented by the International Ladies Garment Worker‟s Union (ILGWU) and 
the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America (Amalgamated) went through periods of 
internal strife and division fundamentally fueled by power struggles between the 
moderate Socialist factions and the left-wing Communist Party.  A similar pattern of 
internal divisions and conflicts would also arise within the fur industry between the 
Socialist-right and the Communist-left, although with some important nuances. In a time 
before the repressive effects of Cold War McCarthyism, the New York garment industry 
unions‟ leadership was split between the old-guard Socialist figures (David Dubinksy, 
Morris Kauffman, Morris Hillquit, Abraham Cahan of The Daily Foward) and radical 
Communist Party leaders (Charles S. Zimmerman and Ben Gold).  The history of 
organized crime in the garment industry from the turn of the century to the 1930s can be 
divided into two phases: the initial period of strong-arm labor-sluggers that spanned from 
Edward “Monk” Eastman to Jacob “ Little Augie” Orgen, to the more sophisticated 
infiltration period of Louis “Lepke” Buchalter and Jacob “Gurrah” Shapiro.   
 6 
In light of the multi-layered composition of these various industries, the essay will 
be organized by category as opposed to a chronology. Proceeding from a basic outline of 
the Garment District‟s political economy, the first section of the paper will deal with the 
role of organized crime within the garment industry; its transition from labor-slugging to 
infiltration, its relations with labor activists, and its role within the capitalist economy.  
The second section will focus on how Socialists and Communists respectively dealt with 
organized crime, both in regards to labor strikes and within their own factional struggles.  
Taking in account the vast amount of resources, prominent individuals, and worker 
strikes that took place in the turbulent, often violent, period at hand, this section will be 
devoted to only few, yet critical, moments in garment industry‟s history that concentrate 
and reveal the most essential elements of the labor/racketeer relations.  Due to the wide 
range in subject matter, the forms of sources for this essay run the gamut from F.B.I. files 
on mobsters, to union convention notes, to Communist Party periodicals, to governmental 
studies on the garment industry, and the tremendous amount of literature produced by 
feuding political factions as they sought control over the garment industries‟ labor 
unions.  Although the actual numbers of people belonging to the various movements and 
organizations can easily be relegated to a small, marginal part of the American 







The Factory and the Skyscraper – As One 
It is not just a simple case of semantics to identify the Garment District as a 
district as opposed to a neighborhood or a community.  While the Garment District 
possessed many of the hallmarks of a typical neighborhood: places of worship, 
restaurants, food markets catering to a specific clientele, and social services; Manhattan‟s 
West Side from 18th street to 40th street was a place where people worked and then made 
the daily commute back home to the newly settled neighborhoods of Brownsville, 
Williamsburg, and the South Bronx.   A garment industry that originally started in the 
tenement homes on the Lower East Side, migrated north due to labor reform legislations 
that enacted a ban on businesses contracting workers to labor from home.
3
 The relatively 
longstanding concentration of garment industries on Manhattan‟s West Side is significant 
in that it remained in the heart of the metropolis as opposed to most of New York‟s 
industries that tended to exist on the outskirts of the city (Brooklyn‟s Navy Yard, Red 
Hook‟s waterfront, or the swamplands of Northern New Jersey).  In the Garment District 
we have the rare situation of an industrial center remaining in the urban core, a locale that 
would have great implications for labor strikes and intense debates that would often spill 
out onto the streets. As historian and literary critic Irving Howe notes, “each day circles 
of argumentative workers would form during lunch hours to discuss politics on the streets 
of the West Thirties: here one could listen to Communists, Socialists, anarchists, 
DeLeonists, and Zionists.”4   
                                                 
3
 For commuting and migration patterns see Nancy L. Green, “ Sweatshop Migrations: The Garment 
Industry Between Home and Shop,” in The Landscape of Modernity, ed. by Edward Lunz and Olivier Zunz 
(New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1992), 220. 
4
 Iving Howe, The American Communist Party, A Critical History, 1919-1957 (Boston: Beacon Press, 
1957), 247. 
 8 
As the industry migrated to the twenties and thirties of Manhattan‟s West Side, a 
chaotic, primitive industrial district developed that can be attributed to “cutthroat 
competition, layers of subcontracting, and a poorly paid mass of immigrant workers.” 5  
A majority of the production plants were not the large industrial factories constructed by 
industrialists such as Henry Ford or imagined by the likes of Fritz Lang as in his futuristic 
Metropolis, but rather smaller, more intimate shops housed within larger buildings that 
were less prone to safety regulations and unionized workers.  Towering buildings could 
house dozens of separate shops, creating a situation where one could find 70 to 80 shops 
on just one small, city block.
6
 Poor working conditions, seasonal labor, and a vulnerable 
immigrant workforce were the foundations to one of New York‟s top industries.  
 Despite the Garment District‟s uncommon economic structure, it remained a 
powerhouse in the New York and national economy.  New York was able to go from 
claiming 44% of all ready-made clothes produced in the United States in 1890 to 65% of 
all readymade clothes in 1904.
7
 Throughout the Great Depression and World War II these 
numbers fluctuated due to the abnormal circumstances brought on by these tremendous 
events, however the strength of New York City‟s grip on the garment industry remained 
firm well into the 1960s.
8
 As long as the garment industry remained at the top of New 
York‟s manufacturing economy (second only to sugar refinery), the Garment District 
proved to be a critical factor in New York‟s economy.  Although the physical sites of 
garment and textile production shifted from cramped Lower East Side tenements to the 
utilitarian factory lofts of the Westside, the „wild buccaneer‟ days of high competition 
                                                 
5
 Robert A. Greenwald, The Triangle Fire, the Protocols of Peace, and Industrial Democracy in 
Progressive New York (Philadelphia: Temple Univ. Press, 2005), 14. 
6
 Ben Gold, Memoirs (New York: Howard Publishers, 1985), 34. 
7
 NY State Department of Labor Report 1901 pg.19 cited in Green, “Sweatshop Migrations”, 216. 
8
 Leon H. Heyserling, “The New York Dress Industry- Problems and Prospects” (Washington, 1963), 1. 
 9 
among many small entrepreneurs scrambling to keep their heads above water persisted 
through the years.  A basic account of the more primitive, competitive capitalist phase of 
the garment industry provides the necessary backdrop to understand the circumstances 
that the racketeers and labor organizers grew out of during the 1910s and 20s.  
 The New York-based garment industry was a true expression of competitive 
capitalism in its pre-monopolistic form.  Dozens upon dozens of small to mid-level 
clothing entrepreneurs and manufacturers would routinely enter a frantic world of high 
risk investments, huge turnaround rates, and a large pool of competitors vying for buyers 
and distributors.  Unlike many American industries such as tobacco, oil, or steel, the 
garment industry remained fragmented and decentralized for several decades well after 
its initial antebellum phase.  As of 1914, 60% of the New York‟s Garment Industry was 
comprised of small shops or factories employing less than 30 workers.
9
  It was a world of 
fast-paced, contracted work, where only parts of the final product were produced in a 
certain locale through a system that operated on various divisions of labor.  As Susan 
Glenn writes in her well-documented Daughters of the Shtetl:  
The peculiar industrial structure of garment manufacturing encouraged immigrant 
entrepreneurship.  Garment production contradicted the anticipated trajectory of 
modern industrial development.  Unlike heavy industry, which tended towards 
consolidation and centralization, the garment industry‟s uneven development 
resulted in a highly decentralized crazy quilt of small and medium sized firms  
with varying degrees of labor specialization….  Hundreds of these small insects 
of manufacturers entered the trade yearly…10  
 
While the garment industry‟s „peculiar industrial structure‟ did in fact leave the door 
open for immigrant entrepreneurs, it also left the door open for another element within 
                                                 
9
 Susan Glenn, Daughters of the Shtetl: Life and Labor in the Immigrant Generation. (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1991), 92. 
10
 Glenn, Daughters of the Shtetl, 93. 
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the immigrant world: organized crime.  Additionally, it created a situation where workers 
were more fragmented organizationally and left them in more vulnerable positions to be 
exploited, which might have been a factor in the strong pull they felt towards the various 
unions (ILGWU, Amalgamated, ect.) that would flourish in the coming years. 
There were several material factors that played a significant role in the interaction 
between organized labor and organized crime within the garment industry.  Small level 
manufacturers and contractors competing against each other, squalid working conditions, 
and densely packed immigrant laborers open to revolutionary ideas lay a basis for this 
convergence.  In addition, it was a common practice among Jewish gangsters during the 
first half of the twentieth century to specifically target and exploit industries dominated 
by Jewish owners.
11
  Here it is necessary to emphasize that these material factors and 
causalities do not produce a set of easy formulas for neatly resolving the questions at 
hand, but do provide important insights in why the web of social forces converged in the 
Garment District in such a unique manner.  Individuals and their own unique 
personalities did have a role in shaping the history of the Garment District as can be seen 
in Louis „Lepke‟ Buchalter.  Although Lepke‟s childhood spent on the streets of the 
Lower East Side could be used to describe the hundreds of thousands of other ordinary 
children who made their way out of one the most crowded ghettos in American history, 
the level of prominence and national attention he received by the time he took his last 
breath in a New York State electrical chair would be matched by a few.     
 
 
                                                 
11
 Steven Fraser, Labor Will Rule:  Sidney Hillman and the Rise of American Labor (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1991), 242 
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Out for Hire 
 As Louis Buchalter was coming of age on the streets of Manhattan‟s Lower East 
Side at the turn of the century, Edward “Monk” Eastman was perfecting his own brand of 
racketeering that would later become known as „labor slugging‟.  Eastman, regarded as 
the first true Jewish gangster,
12
 pioneered the criminal enterprise of hiring out thugs to 
harass, attack, or possibly kill disruptive workers or union leaders.  Articles in the press 
dating as far back as 1900 contained reports detailing picket lines violently broken up by 
„hired goons‟.13 Establishing a reputation and clientele among the numerous 
manufacturers then based on the Lower East Side, Eastman would hire out members of 
his gang to any boss or factory owner willing to pay.  To date there are no accounts of 
Eastman voicing any concerns or empathy toward the striking workers he was 
responsible for assaulting.  What exists is only the records of a ruthless criminal who put 
profit above anything else.  Eastman would eventually drift away from the underworld 
after serving a ten -year prison sentence, however other up-and-coming Lower East Side 
gangsters such as Big Jack Zelig picked up right where Eastman left off.  Big Jack 
Zelig‟s thugs for hire became so commonplace, that a listing advertising his various rates 
was widely known within the garment industry: 
 Slash on the cheek with knife: $1 - $10 
 Shot in the leg: $1 - $25 
 Shot in the arm: $5 - $25 
 Throwing a bomb: $5 - $50 
 Murder: $10 - $100 
14
  
                                                 
12
 Albert Fried, The Rise and Fall of the Jewish Gangster in America (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1993 edition), 27-28 
13
 “ Goons Hired by Roth to Assault Strikers; Waistmakers Resolute”, 1/8/1900 contained in Max Danish 
and Leon Stein ed.  ILGWU News-History 1900-1950: The Story of the Ladies Garment Workers (Atlantic 
City, New Jersey: ILGWU Publishing, 1950), pg. 5. 
14
 Paul R. Kavieff, The Life and Times of Lepke Buchalter: America's Most Ruthless Labor Racketeer (Fort 
Lee, New Jersey: Barricade Books, 2006), 10. 
 12 
 
In a vivid account from furrier Ben Gold, he describes the circumstances of a mob assault 
on a 1926 furrier strike: 
The worried leaders of the bosses‟ association…decided to employ the necessary 
means to break the strike…During the previous weeks the gangsters who had 
been hired by the bosses to bring the few scab workers into the shops each 
morning hadn‟t dared use their fists against the workers…Suddenly one morning 
the gangsters came out of their hiding places and beat a large number of strikers 
mercilessly… 15  
 
He later goes on to reflect, “ The leaders of the strike understood the bosses had not hired 
these murderers for a single “visit.”  It was also clear to us that the goal of the bosses was 
to chase the pickets away from their shops, and that the lives of the pickets were in 
danger.”16  
Although labor disputes during the first decade of the twentieth century caused an 
intense polarization that often led to demonstrations and pitched street battles, Zelig hired 
his thugs out to both sides of conflict, seeking to reap as much profit as possible.  Often 
times employers would turn to gangsters like Eastman or Zelig to violently break up 
picket lines or privately rough-up dissident union leaders. However, in some cases, union 
leaders would hire out thugs to protect workers from riot police or other hired thugs.  
Another Lower East Side gangster, „Dopey‟ Benny Fein, is an important example (and 
exception) of a crime boss who hired his crew out to protect workers as revealed in the 
fact that he was placed on the payroll for the United Hebrew Trades union as well as 
being a card carrying member of the ILGWU.
17
     
                                                 
15
 Gold, Memoirs, 73. 
16
 Ibid., 73. 
17
 Kavieff, Lepke Buchalter, 23. 
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 In the years from roughly 1900 to 1925, the temporary agreements struck between 
gangsters and garment leaders (both on the side of capitol and labor) were highly 
reflective of the archaic, street-level period of the Jewish Lower East Side gangster yet to 
pass through the stage of what would become the modern organized crime model.  
Throughout the various phases of racketeering in the garment industry before Lepke, 
from Monk Eastman to Little Augie, racketeers remained on the periphery of the 
industry, only brought in as an outside mediator to settle labor conflicts in an era still 
lacking in standardized, legal protocol.  Of course there are notable exceptions such as 
Dopey Benny‟s three year run with the United Hebrew Trades or Little Augie‟s year-long 
work with the Communist Party in 1926, however the nature of this early period of 
racketeering is characterized by loose, temporal relations and a mainly outsider status.  
The reign of garment industry racketeers was relatively short lived during this period 
starting with Eastman (1898 -1904), Zelig (1908-1912), Fein (1911-1915), Nathan „Kid 
Dropper‟ Kaplan (1918-1923), and the last of the „old-fashioned gangsters‟ Jacob “Little 
Augie” Orgen (1919-1927) who remained in power for the longest period of time.  In 
addition, there were periods of economic growth within the garment industry (1914-
1921)
18
 that diminished the need for a violent, external force provided by racketeers, 
along with bloody gang wars between Kid Dropper and Little Augie (1919-1923) that 
obscured their level of control over the industry until Kid Dropper‟s death in 1923.  With 
the exception of Dopey Benny‟s temporary alignment with the United Hebrew Trades 
and the ILGWU, a defining characteristic of the pre-Lepke racketeers was their 
willingness and ambition to sell their services to the highest bidder.   
                                                 
18
 Fried, The Rise and Fall, 136. 
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Journalists and historians of various fields who have written extensively on either 
racketeering or labor movements take the racketeers‟ duality as a given, yet it raises 
several important questions about the nature of the criminal class.  A point that has yet to 
be sufficiently explored within the literature of both organized crime and organized labor 
is the commonality of their respective backgrounds.  In this particular case, we have a 
movement of exploited workers, a majority of which were Jewish or Italian, putting their 
very lives on the line to fight for livable wages and dignified working conditions under 
incredibly difficult circumstances.  Within this context, racketeer after racketeer, most of 
whom hail from the same Lower East Side streets as the striking workers; who share a 
common history, class background, and cultural tradition, made the choice of violently 
breaking up strikes, protecting “scab” workers crossing picket lines, or playing both sides 
for the biggest pay-off.  Unfortunately one can only speculate about their inner thoughts 
or the various private conversations on the matter due to lack of documentation.  
However, the consistent policy of remaining neutral within a several different intense, 
polarized labor struggles remains the most convincing evidence that the various 
racketeers followed the dictates of capitalism when confronted with a movement of 
workers struggling for reform and progress.  Unfettered by political sympathies or ethical 
principles, gangsters such as Kid Dropper and Big Jack Zelig employed a pragmatic, 
calculated approach of making profit the bottom line – a fundamental law of capitalism 
applied by a criminal class acting outside the law of the state.  
 It would be inaccurate to portray the pre-Lepke racketeers as simply shock troops 
or a supra-legal, brute force by the factory owners to crush movements for social and 
economic justice.  Although this was overwhelmingly the case, the origins of 
 15 
racketeering do not fit into a neat, logical conclusion as union leaders (most of which 
were either Socialists or Communists in the 1920s) also employed underworld figures off 
and on throughout beginning of the twentieth century.  While it makes sense in many 
respects for employers to hire thugs to exercise brute force in order to break up picket 
lines and intimidate noncompliant union leaders, the use of criminal figures by unions or 
communist-led worker committees seems more unlikely and raises serious questions of 
how organized labor viewed organized crime.  This is a question that will be further 
explored and assessed later in the essay.  However, first we must turn our attention to 
Lepke in order to understand labor racketeering in its more developed, modern form. 
L & G – The Brains and the Brawn 
“What did I do that J.P. Morgan didn‟t do?...It‟s all a racket.  Isn‟t Wall Street a 
racket where the strong take advantage of the weak?  Every industry needs a 
strong man.  After you put us in jail, another strong man will come up to keep the 
industry from becoming a jungle.” 




It was only a matter of a few days when Louis Buchalter found himself gravitating back 
to his old, familiar haunts on the Lower East Side after being released from prison in 
1922.  It was at some point soon after his release when he reconnected with his childhood 
friend, Jacob “Gurrah” Shapiro, a brutish gorilla who joined Lepke as a teen robbing 
pushcart vendors in Brooklyn.
20
 Gurrah and Lepke would soon join the ranks of fellow 
Lower East Side gangsters such as Meyer Lansky and Charlie “Lucky” Luchiano as the 
new breed of underworld bosses- responsible for marking a new era in organized crime.  
As Gurrah and Lepke worked their way up the hierarchy of Little Augie‟s criminal outfit, 
                                                 
19
 Cited in Fried, The Rise and Fall of the Jewish Gangster, 166. 
20
 Jay Maeder, “Lepke Surrenders To Winchell, 1939,” New York Daily News, May 29, 1998, 
http://articles.nydailynews.com/1998-05-29/news/18070041_1_walter-winchell-fat-man-boss ( accessed 
April 20, 2011). 
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they increasingly set their sights on replacing Little Augie at the top. In addition to Little 
Augie, Lepke would often carry out assignments from underworld kingpin Arnold 
Rothstein.  By the mid-1920s the tide was beginning to change; underworld crime bosses 
such as Arnold Rothstein and Meyer Lansky were pushing Little Augie to retire from his 
“labor-slugging days” and begin infiltrating the garment industry‟s unions.21  Infiltration 
of the unions meant an ongoing, systematic business of extortion and shakedowns 
amongst the various industries within the Garment District (textiles, furs, pocketbooks, 
trucking used to transport goods).  Little Augie‟s resistance to change ended with his 
assassination in 1926. Lepke‟s ascension to the top of the Jewish underworld did not 
simply represent a „change of the guards‟ within the garment industry rackets, but instead 
a radical rupture in organized crime‟s approach towards racketeering. 
In the aftermath of the historic New York 1926 Communist-led textile strike, the 
“strong-arm goons” didn‟t recede back into the shadows as usual, but remained fixtures 
within the garment unions under Lepke‟s leadership.  Local after local, company after 
company, Lepke muscled his way into the innerworkings of American industry.  As 
opposed to most gangsters who competed over drugs, alcohol, and prostitution, Lepke 
held a monopoly over several aspects of the food, trucking, and needle-trades industries.  
Lepke employed union officials such as Max Rubin (officer of Teamsters Local 240)
22
 
and Philip  Orlovsky (manager of the Cutters Local Number 4)
23
  to help facilitate his 
empire.  Rubin and Orlovsky are figures who were elevated into the public eye after they 
were placed on trial as witnesses to bring down Lepke, however it can be said with very 
                                                 
21
 Fried, The Rise and Fall of the Jewish Gangster, 143. 
22
 Kavieff, 56. 
23
 Ibid., 48. 
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little hesitation that there were many more Rubins and Orlovskys on Lepke‟s payroll.  In 
addition to Lepke‟s ability to payoff corrupt union officials, he was able to infiltrate 
unions by working hand in hand with union leaders such as Amalgamated President 
Sidney Hillman and Furrier Union leader Morris Kauffman to eliminate Communist-led 
unions or factions within the clothing and furs unions.  
Remaining true to character, Lepke sought to reap profits from both corrupt union 
leaders and desperate manufacturers.  It is in examining Lepke‟s racketeering practices in 
the manufacturing associations that his innovative methods and crucial role in the 
legitimate business world shines brightest.  As aforementioned, the garment industry was 
a cutthroat competitive world of hundreds of small shops with a few large firms.  Largely 
in line with general capitalist dynamics, high-competition was a welcomed business 
feature during times of boom and prosperity, but a death sentence for an industry facing 
the steepest economic depression in American history.  In 1929, years prior to New Deal 
era reforms such as the National Industrial Recovery Act, ILGWU President Benjamin 
Schlesinger summed up the centrality of the protective efforts in rebuilding his struggling 
union, “our suggestion to all three groups of employers was a joint responsibility…a joint 
effort to stabilize the industries…make each party that is in agreement with the protective 
the only controlling factor in its respective field…employers are to only deal with 
subcontractors in it (it being the protective).
24
  The union‟s successful efforts were 
praised as a triumph as the head of ILGWU‟s education department wrote years later in 
1941,  “our efforts to bring order out chaos in what was once properly called the most 
                                                 
24
 Schlesinger speech cited in Danish and Stein, ILGWU News-History 1900-1950, 61. 
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sweated industry in this country had taxed all our efforts.”25 What is not discussed in the 
official union histories of the needle-trades industry is the essential role of organized 
crime in stabilizing these industries.  New York Special Prosecutor Thomas E. Dewey‟s 
trial prosecution of Lepke and Gurrah produced numerous testimonies among 
manufacturers and union leaders alike who described being targeted for intimidation and 
harassment when they did not initially comply with the protective system.
26
   
Lepke‟s reach into the protective associations expanded beyond the textile 
industries and into the newly emerging fur and leather protectives.  No different than 
textitles, Lepke secured and maintained his position of power through harassment, 
beatings, bombings, truck hijackings, arson, and occasionally murder.
27
 All methods were 
employed without fail when businesses strayed from the fur protectives or refused to pay 
Lepke his weekly extortion fees.
28
   The case of a Mr. Joseph who ran a business 
importing rabbit skins in the New York-New Jersey area provides a graphic example of 
Lepke‟s practice of intimidation and violent assault.  After receiving several phone 
threats for refusing to pay the full extortion fee to the protective he was attacked by an 
unknown gangster on May 14, 1933.  As Joseph was sitting on a bench in front of his 
home, the gangster approached him, tore off a newspaper which was wrapped around a 
bottle of acid and splashed the acid into Joseph‟s face, stating “Now you‟ve got it.”29 All 
of this occurred with an overwhelming amount of regularity; Lepke and his men began to 
                                                 
25
 Julius Hochman, ILGWU’s Department of Education Annual Report (New York: ILGWU Publishing, 
1942), 3. 
26
 Thomas E. Dewey, Twenty Against the Underworld (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1974) 
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find their place in the industry, almost strangely settling into the banal, mundane 
workings of legitimate business and union bureaucracy.
30
  
Given the primitive, localized nature of the needle trades industry it is critical to 
take in account the direct relationship between the unions and the protectives.  In a highly 
illustrative incident, labor organizer Morris Langer was killed by a car bombing when he 
refused to submit to Lepke‟s demands.  Langer was a Communist and was responsible for 
the organizational activities of the Needle Trade Workers Industrial Union (the NTWIU 
was a dual-union created by the CP). A unionized fur shop in upstate Gloversville was 
operating outside of the fur protective, thus making it a target for Lepke and the 
manufacturers.  Langer emphatically turned down Lepke‟s demands to call for a worker‟s 
strike against the plant as a means to pressure the Gloversville owners to comply with the 
Protective.  In light of the situation, a conference between the NTWIU and the Protective 
Fur Dressers Corporation was called for in February 1933.  After the NTWIU refused to 
close the Gloversville shop, a representative from the fur protective pulled a few leaders 
from the NTWIU aside and threatened to bomb the shop if the union did not comply with 
their demands to put workers on the picket line.  It was at this conference that Langer  
“spoke out very strongly against the Protective”. 31  According to Ben Gold, Langer told 
Lepke‟s intermediary Samuel Mittelman that, “ the union is not a partner to any racketeer 
and that our methods are very different from the socialist union leaders.” Langer went on 
to state, “ We are interested in the wages and conditions of the workers and not in 
racketeering, and since the Gloversville workers are receiving union wages…the Union 
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will not call these shops on strike.”32  Langer remained committed to his Communist 
principles during the course of the whole ordeal until his body was blown apart a month 




   
 Lepke‟s infiltration of the garment industry‟s unions and protectives underscores 
ILGWU historian Gus Tyler‟s statement that, “ the underworld is an economic system 
within our economic system; a law within our law…” 34.  While it was incredibly rare for 
an ordinary worker to see Lepke or Gurrah walking through a shop floor or union office, 
it was clear to the majority of the rank-and-file who was among the „connected‟, when it 
came to identifying corrupt union officials. Writers such as Paul R. Kavieff and James 
Jacobs (Mobsters, Unions, and Feds)
35
 argue that organized crime has had a crippling 
effect on American businesses through its predatory attacks, high extortion rates, and 
labor lockouts.  Jacobs‟s contention rests on a substantial amount of evidence that does in 
fact point to the detrimental effects of the Mafia on American businesses, however it 
ignores the glaring contradiction that organized crime could not really operate on the 
level it did without the cooperation, or at the very least complicity, of the legitimate 
business world.   
Lepke‟s indispensable role in creating industry cartels set the grounds for fixed 
prices, stabilized labor costs, and the muscle to eliminate smaller shops that could 
potentially provide cheaper prices.  The shift toward a more monopolistic character 
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during the Lepke era is similar to a more universal tendency of organized crime to forge 
monopolies out of the industry‟s they succeed in dominating.  Although writing about the 
economics of the Mafia in Italy, Pino Arlacchi‟s description of the Mafia‟s competitive 
advantage holds true to Lepke and his Italian-American successors: “ through the 
discouragement of competition, the entrepreneurial Mafia has come to enjoy a series of 
local monopolies in sectors of economic activity…”.35  Arlacchi identifies three main 
factors that account of the Mafia‟s competitive advantage, “(1) monopolies that are 
maintained by force if necessary…(2) keeping worker wages low and limiting 
benefits…(3) access to funds through illegal means.”36  
The formation of local monopolies was a common feature among Jewish and 
Italian mobsters in the United States, and is often cited as a primary reason for their 
success in making a tremendous amount of profits.
37
  It was Lepke‟s brutal efficiency in 
forcing manufacturers to comply with protective associations, along with his network of 
hired thugs that were willing to circumvent the law by deploying brute force in order to 
repress striking workers demanding labor reforms, that he was able to secure a position of 
power and prestige in the garment industry.  The testimony of small businessmen 
recounting attacks they faced after refusing to cooperate with industry protectives and the 
use of “strong-arm men” to break up worker pickets provides ample evidence that 
explicates how Lepke‟s role served the interests and aims of the garment manufacturers.  
However, where did organized crime fit into the other side of the equation – amongst the 
labor organizers, union leaders, and various Marxist radicals? 
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The Lumpen 
As America entered into the twentieth century, the Socialist movement gained a 
notable surge in popularity with more than a thousand Socialists who had been elected to 
office and a press circulation of roughly two million.
38
  Reaching beyond the usual 
bastions of radical politics found in urban immigrant communities, socialist ideals began 
to find themselves embraced in the heartland. With publications such as the Kansas-based 
Appeal to Reason, socialist propaganda garnered a hearing among the struggling, 
downtrodden farmers.  However, due to a series of stepped up repressive crackdowns 
carried out by the American government and the mounting irreconcilable political 
differences within the Socialist Party, the movement‟s influence dwindled and its 
momentum slowed down considerably.
39
 The movement did in fact split as a result of the 
Russian Revolution, with a growing number of revolutionaries in America coming to 
agree with the essential features of a Leninist revolution, namely a disciplined vanguard 
party organizing the working class for the opportunity to wage a violent, revolutionary 
struggle for power during a moment of crisis within the capitalist system.  Through the 
various ebbs and flows of Socialist political movements in America, the New York 
garment industry remained a stronghold throughout these trying years.   
 At its most elementary level, before the intense political questions over the 
transition of power from the bourgeoisie to the proletariat, Marxists of the time period 
adhered to a basic, general doctrine explaining the laws of history, economics, politics, 
religion, and philosophy.  Taking in account the basic methodology and set of principles 
                                                 
38
 Irving Howe, Socialism and America (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Publishers, 1985), 3-4. 
39
 Divisions in the Socialist movement during this time were centered around debates over the question of 
including or excluding immigrant workers, organizing around local elections or utilizing direct action 
tactics, and the correct response to the outbreak of World War I. 
 23 
established within the Marxist movement with concepts such as historical materialism 
and the primacy of the economic base to serve as standards for future movements that 
would arise after Marx‟s death…where does Marx‟s writings on crime and criminals 
factor into the movement that would bear his name in the United States?   
 Accusations of dogmatism and pie-in-the-sky idealism that are frequently directed 
at Marxists or Communists would find little resonance when assessing the history of the 
American Marxists‟ position on criminals, or what is commonly referred in Marxian 
terms as the lumpenproletariat.  Although Marxists would formulate policies and 
propaganda based on their reading and interpretations of Marxist thought, it is clear that 
the question of the lumpenproletariat was „conveniently avoided‟ and ignored among 
both socialists and communists organizing in the American labor movement.  Marx did 
not write extensively about the lumpenproletariat, but provided a concise, straightforward 
position in his most popular work The Communist Manifesto: 
 The lumpenproletariat, this passive putrefaction of the lowest strata of the old  
 society is here and there swept into the movement by a proletariat revolution, 





Marx‟s life-long collaborator Frederich Engels, who co-wrote The Communist Manifesto, 
elaborated further when he wrote: 
 The lumpenproletariat, this scum of the decaying elements of all classes, 
 which establishes headquarters in all the big cities, is the worst of all possible  
 allies.  It is an absolutely venal, brazen crew…Every leader of the workers who 
 utilizes these gutter proletarians as guards or supporters, proves himself by this  
 action alone to be a traitor to the movement…41 
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Here it is important to make a distinction between the thieves and underground criminal 
networks analyzed by Marx and Engels, and the modernized, organized crime syndicates 
of the 1930s.  Plausible at the time in which he was writing, Marx did not anticipate or 
foresee the future development of crime to take on a more sophisticated, entrepreneurial 
form that would assimilate itself into the legitimate business world and command a 
greater degree of power in the national economy.  This development would presumably 
only magnify Marx and Engels‟s disdain for the lumpen class.  Additionally, we are 
given a real living sense of Marx‟s view that the lumpenproletariat can be easily 
persuaded to betray the revolution when bringing our attention to the early practices of 
gangsters such as Monk Eastman and Big Jack Zelig who would not hesitate to shift their 
alliances given the right price. 
 Given the simple, straightforward language used by Marx and Engles to 
demystify any illusions or possible sympathies the revolutionaries might have had 
regarding the lumpenproletariat, what was the rationale amongst the Marxist parties and 
individuals who voluntarily entered into business agreements and organizing efforts with 
gangsters who personified unbridled capitalist practices at their most extreme? However, 
what we find among the socialists and communists on the question of the 
lumpenproletariat is an unprincipled duality.  In a classic display of hypocrisy bordering 
on the surreal, union leaders denounced the evils of labor racketeering, all the while 
shaking hands with the likes of Lepke Buchalter and Carlo Gambino.
42
  Historians will 
not find any major union leaders in the garment industry that publically advocated or 
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justified the use of strong-arm men to maintain their positions and push forward their 
agendas.  However, we do have numerous speeches and campaigns organized by union 
leaders such as ILGWU‟s David Dubinsky, Amalgamated president Sidney Hillman, and 
articles from the C.P.‟s Daily Worker taking aim at corruption within unions.43   
First Lessons in the Revolution 
Under the leadership of William Z. Foster, the Communist Party was steadily 
making advances in the labor movement by adopting Foster‟s strategy of “boring from 
within”.  Opposed to dual-unionism,44 Foster brought his Trade Union Education League 
(TUEL) into the CP when he became a member in 1923.  By 1926, a series of 
simultaneous strikes were initiated by Communists for better working conditions in the 
textile mills of Passaic, New Jersey, in New York City‟s women‟s wear, and by the 
neighboring furriers.  Although the Communists were heavily involved with economic 
and social justice campaigns prior to 1926, this would be their first major foray into 
leading a major, long-term strike involving thousands of workers.  Both the Passaic 
textile strike and New York dressmakers‟ strike ended as utter failures for the 
Communists, decimating their reputation and leadership positions.  In stark contrast, the 
furriers‟ strike was a surprising success, strengthening their control over locals in the 
International Fur Workers‟ Union (IFWU).  In a certain sense, the 1926 dressmakers‟ 
strike of the ILGWU was the beginning of the end for the CP in two regards: the first 
being the end of the control over a majority of ILGWU locals in New York City, and 
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secondly, the dissolution of their partnership with organized crime.  Of course, with the 
pervasive influence of organized crime in American labor unions and the continuing 
organizing activities carried out by communists in the trade union movement, one cannot 
imagine these two entities wouldn‟t collaborate under some exceptional circumstances 
that remained private affairs.  However, in the main, after 1926 the relationship between 
the C.P and labor racketeers would increasingly shift from uneasy partners to bitter 
enemies.   
 On the surface, the 1926 labor dispute over fair wages and stable hours appeared 
to be an important, yet simple issue, no different than many other labor disputes that 
flared up that year.  However, beneath the surface raged a major struggle between the 
Socialist faction and the Communist faction over control of the union locals.  In addition, 
within the warring ILGWU factions, a major power struggle persisted within the 
Communist Party between those aligned with William Z. Foster and those grouped 
around Charles Ruthenberg.  The strike stretched on for twenty long weeks, sapping the 
energy of strikers and depleting their financial resources.  The Socialists accepted the 
initial settlement proposed by the employers and New York Governor Alfred E. Smith 
early into the strike, however the Communist-led Joint Board of the ILGWU flat out 
rejected it on the basis of “no class collaboration” and continued the strike.  The 
employers hired Irish gangster Legs Diamond to brutally crackdown on pickets and guard 
scabs as they attempted to cross picket lines.  The CP hired gangster Little Augie to 
protect pickets and wreak havoc on shops operating during the strike.  In addition to the 
intensified police repression and the massive hemorrhaging of funds due to the strike, 
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violent confrontations degenerated into gun battles and armed raids instigated by both 
sides.
45
   
 The strike escalated from fistfights to gunfire when an ILGWU picket was shot 
and killed on 26
th




  The following week news 
headlines trumpeted another spate of shootings after gangsters attacked a group of pickets 
investigating a possible non-union shop operating during the strike.  Morris Kaplan and 
six other pickets were walking up a staircase in a Garment District building when five 
gangsters pulled out their guns and began shooting the strikers.
47
  The outbreaks of 
violence were not one-sided in any sense.  It was only a few days later when ten unnamed 
individuals stormed into a clothing factory operating in defiance of the union strike.  The 
raiders destroyed shop equipment, attacked machine operators, and threw the factory‟s 
owner out of a window.
48
  The targeting of individuals operating during the strike 
persisted as three men attacked a shop owner walking home from work on Manhattan‟s 
Upper West Side.
49
  The use of violent force has been a common feature in the history of 
labor struggles, both on the picket lines and as a means to resolve internal problems, 
however the Dressmakers‟ Strike of 1926 ranks among the most violent episodes in 
American labor history.  Taking a step beyond simply the police or hired thugs attacking 
strikers, the pickets unsavory, violent tactics pushed the situation to a different level.  The 
common occurrence of violence surrounding the strike began to get so out of hand that 
                                                 
45
 Fried, The Rise and Fall…, 138-141 and Howe, American Communist Party, 247-251. 
46
 “Gang Leader Freed, Police Look For Him”, New York Times, July 11,1926, 3. 
47
 “Four More Shot in Garment Strike”, New York Times, July 16, 1926, 3-4. 
48
 The owner, Harold Liebowitz, miraculously saved himself by catching an awning on his drop down.  He 
dangled from the awning as crowds below stopped to watch him. He finally climbed back to safety. 
“Violence in Garment Strike Continues”, New York Times, July 17, 1926, 9-10. 
49
 “Garment Owner Attacked on Upper West Side”, New York Times, September 6, 1926, 12. 
 28 
the New York State District Attorney had to resort to forming a special bureau to handle 
the cases growing out of the strike.
50
  
 The pervasive use of organized crime was so entrenched in the events of the 
strike, that the underworld not only an active participant, but ultimately ended up as the 
only mediating force that could end the strike.  As David Dubinsky recounts in his 
memoir David Dubinsky: A Life With Labor, the CP initially contacted Abraham 
Rothstein, a businessman and esteemed member of New York‟s Jewish community.  
Abraham passed at the CP‟s request, and instead suggested they seek out assistance from 
another businessman in the garment industry.  Abraham‟s Rothstein‟s friend in the 
garment industry declined the CP‟s request as well, he then recommended the CP meet 
Abraham‟s estranged son – underworld kingpin Arnold Rothstein.  Arnold Rothstien 
agreed and met with CP leader Charles S. Zimmerman.  With relative ease, Rothstein 
convinced Legs Diamond to cease his work for the manufacturers.  Next, Rothstein put in 
a phone call to order Little Augie to take his crew off the dressmakers‟ strike.  In a matter 
of a few weeks, Rothstein was able to broker a deal and bring the Joint Board (the CP‟s 
left-wing faction in the ILGWU) and the bosses to settle on an agreement.
51
 
 Predictably, any mention or self-criticism of hiring mobsters would not be found 
in any CP publications after the strike.  The CP held rallies where speakers accused 
Amalgamated leader Sidney Hillman of hiring gangsters to attack workers, and generally 
accusing the Socialists of purposely sabotaging the strike.
52
  The Socialists seized on the 
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Communists‟ failure to regain key leadership positions in the ILGWU locals.  Rallies 
were held by the ILGWU Cutter Locals in order to pass resolutions to drive the 
“communist reds” out of the union, thus beginning a concentrated attack on the 
Communist-dominated locals.
53
  If one were to only go by David Dubinksy‟s account of 
the ILGWU, the racketeers and the gangsters fade out of the picture after the 1926 strike.  
However, this was simply not the case, as the problem of labor racketeering would only 
increase under his leadership of the union.  
The Labor Statesmen 
You see, studying human nature I came to the conclusion people prefer to be 
righteous at home and a so-called sinner someplace else. – Meyer Lansky54 
    
In discussing the history of David Dubinsky (ILGWU) and Sidney Hillman 
(Amalgamated), their similarities often overshadow their differences.  Both shared a 
common history of coming of age in the monumental 1905 Russian Revolution, where 
both shared the same fate of being imprisoned for their political activities and 
subsequently finding asylum in the United States.  Although Hillman never officially 
joined with the Socialist Party like Dubinsky, he maintained a close, consistent 
relationship with SP leaders in the garment industry and the influential Yiddish-Socialist 
publication The Jewish Daily Forward.  Despite the fact that Hillman was briefly 
impressed and quasi-supportive of the efficiency possessed by the Soviet economic 
system in the early 1920s, both leaders made their steadfast anti-Communism a defining 
feature of their careers.  The intensity and resoluteness of their convictions to eradicate 
the Communist Party and/or its TUUL (Trade Union Unity League) from the garment 
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industry often led them to collude with Lepke‟s sluggers, and in some cases, Lepke 
himself. 
 By the time Sidney Hillman consolidated his control over Amalgamated, he was 
already making strides in his rise to power under the FDR administration. Hillman would 
go on to leave behind the legacy of being the “labor statesman”- a key architect of the 
New Deal‟s landmark National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) and a cofounder of the 
CIO labor federation.  Matthew Josephson‟s Sidney Hillman, Statesman of American 
Labor, widely considered the definitive biography on Hillman until the early 1990s, 
portrays Hillman as a tireless crusader against evils of labor racketeering.  Josephson 
painstakingly details the all-night meetings, the meticulous plans, and the violent 
episodes of all-out street battles that raged throughout the Garment District during the 
summer of 1931.
55
  The events surrounding Hillman‟s anti-racketeering campaign in 
1931 are significant in that they once again display the violent reprisals met by the 
workers once they confronted Lepke‟s hold on the garment industry.  However, 
Josephson‟s accurate account of the 1931 campaign against labor racketeers omits 
Hillman‟s history with the underworld before and after the summer of 1931, thus 
presenting a highly problematic portrayal of Hillman.   
 Josephson‟s Sidney Hillman, followed by Melech Epstein‟s Profiles of Eleven, 
both suffer from completely glossing over Hillman‟s frequent collaborations with Lepke 
and Gurrah prior to the Great Depression, along with falsely declaring that Hillman 
heroically drove the plague of gangsterism out of the Amalgamated union.
56
 According to 
Josephson, “…no other American labor leader had ever put up such a relentless fight 
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against the under world as had Hillman… If citizens all over had joined him… it would 
have bid fair to rid the country of its worst social evil.”57 However, the public image of 
Hillman as a champion of labor was often at odds with his private reliance on organized 
crime figures to carry out his “dirty work”.  Hillman‟s main defense in regards to union 
corruption was always one of ignorance.  His comments, along with his earlier 
biographers, maintain he was unaware of the serious nature of labor racketeering and 
corruption until the end of the 1920s.  This convenient position fits in nicely with the 
courageous union reformer of 1931, however it covers up an ongoing, documented 
history of his personal use of gangsters and strong-arm men to fortify his leadership 
within the union. 
  Although Hillman‟s Amalgamated never faced the kind of internal warfare that 
nearly destroyed the ILGWU, he was gravely concerned by the murmurs of Communist 
opposition beginning to brew within the Amalgamated.
58
  (Footnote election that 
challenged his re-election)  Hillman was more concerned with the possibilities of his 
hegemony being challenged by insurgent Communists than ideological debates raging 
between old-guard Socialists and Bolshevik Communists.  In his updated biography on 
Hillman, historian Steven Fraser reveals,  
“…after 1924, with the shift in factional alignments, Hillman turned a blind eye to   
those same criminal associations ( associations being the Socialist Party’s 
connections to gangsters –authors note), as Socialist Party apparatchiks proved to 
be enthusiastic red-hunters, not at all squeamish about using the roughest tactics 
for dealing with Hillman‟s new opponents on the left. More than anyone else, the 
right-wing Socialist and Forward Loyalist Abraham Beckerman emerged as the 
union‟s enforcer against the remains of the Communist Party…With Hillman‟s 
approval he quickly became a power in the New York union and was even 
elevated to the GEB, where his open advocacy of strongarm methods sometimes 
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embarrassed others in the leadership.  Even more embarrassing, however, was 
Beckerman‟s evident toleration of and even connivance with the Lepke gang, 
which, amid all the internal turmoil, began its penetration of the strategically 
important Cutters‟ Local 4.  It is nearly impossible to believe Hillman was in the 




Abraham Beckerman, a name scantly ever mentioned in any current historical 
accounts of the labor movement, is one of the most important figures in understanding 
the relationship between the organized left and organized crime during the Great 
Depression.  Beckerman, who earned the nickname “Knockout”, was a delegate at both 
Socialist Party and Amalgamated conventions;
60
 the Amalgamated representative in 
AFL‟s “ Committee for Preservations of the Trade Unions”, which declared war on the 
Communist Party in 1926;
61
 and the head of the Amalgamated New York Cutters‟ Local 
4.  The importance of the cutters‟ locals cannot be emphasized enough, as the clothing 
industry hinged on the work carried out by the cutters‟ division. 
  Beckerman was joined by a fellow SP functionary and Lepke-controlled union 
leader Philip Orlovsky, who served as Local 4‟s executive secretary.  Orlovsky and 
Beckerman created their own “fiefdom” in Cutters‟ Local 4, operating almost 
autonomously and brutally stifling any dissent that posed a threat to their authority.  
Through Beckerman‟s and Orlovsky‟s cooperation, Lepke was able to extort a portion of 
the rank-and-file dues and receive funds from the men‟s clothing protectives for 
“administering the rough stuff” to manufacturing shops that strayed from the protective 
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  Despite complaints from various Amalgamated officials about Lepke‟s 
infiltration of Local 4, Hillman remained largely indifferent to the widespread 
corruption.
63
  It would take the catastrophic effects of the Great Depression for Hillman 
to spring into action against the racketeers.   
With the deepening crisis brought on by the Great Depression, manufacturers 
began dramatically reducing workers‟ wages.   At the behest of Lepke (who was simply 
transmitting and enforcing the decisions of the manufacturers) Orlovsky and Beckerman 
began reducing the rank-and-file wages.  This incident would prove to be the breaking 
point for Hillman; the wage reduction was a flagrant violation to union policy and 
effectively delegitimized his leadership.  As detailed in Josephson‟s biography, Hillman 
led the union‟s rank-and-file to successfully picket a Lepke-controlled shop, along with 
physically seizing Local 4‟s headquarters from Orlovsky.64  Hillman did objectively rid 
the Amalgamated of the corrupted and parasitic rule of Beckerman-Orlovsky.  However, 
what needs to be called into question is Hillman‟s intentions and overall orientation 
towards labor racketeering, which in this case was embodied by Lepke Buchalter.  
Contrary to the conventional narrative, Hillman‟s dramatic crusade against labor 
racketeers in 1931 was fundamentally about regaining control over a runaway local.  If 
Josephson‟s account of the aftermath of the 1931 anti-racketeering campaign was true, it 
would lend a certain amount of credibility to the claims that Hillman “ cleansed and 
redeemed”65 Local 4.  However, far from being “cleansed and redeemed”, the 
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Amalgamated Union remained a base of operations for Lepke, with the only change 
coming from a new set of names and faces under his control. 
Matthew Josephson and Jean Gould (Sidney Hillman: Great American)
66
 write of 
the relative ease Hillman‟s aide Murray Weinstein had in removing Phillip Orlovsky 
from the premises of Local 4‟s offices the morning of August 29, 1931.  However, the 
background to Orlovsky‟s non-confrontational exit actually stems from the fact that 
Lepke brokered a deal with Hillman, trading off Orlovsky for a new set of 
intermediaries.
67
  Despite the egregious amount of evidence implicating Orlovsky, 
Beckerman, and his associates in violating union protocol and breaking the law in 
general, charges were never brought against Orlovsky and company.  Under Hillman‟s 
watch, Orlovsky was removed from his post, with Bruno Belea, Sam Katz, Paul Berger, 
and former boxer Danny Fields brought in to serve as intermediaries between Lepke and 
the union.  We now know from FBI testimonies that Belea and company received 280 
dollars a week between 1932 and 1936 to oversee Lepke‟s extortion racket.  When 
Hillman wanted truckers to discontinue shipments going to non-union contractors in New 
Jersey he turned to Lepke to enforce the stoppage.
68
  Beyond Hillman‟s posturing and 
brief outbursts against organized crime in the New York, in reality, Hillman essentially 
tolerated criminal elements, so long as they did not challenge his leadership.  Throughout 
the 1920s and 30s he utilized gangsters and/or corrupt union officials connected up with 
criminal syndicates when it was convenient and conducive to pushing through his plans.  
During the Lepke-era of labor racketeering, Hillman‟s approach to organized crime 
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infiltration was not one guided by ideals or ethical considerations, but one fundamentally 
rooted in practicality, efficiency, and pragmatism.  
Much of the same can be said about ILGWU leader David Dubinksy.  Early in his 
career as a labor organizer, Dubinsky found a foothold in the ILG‟s Cutters‟ Local 10, 
where he was elected the general manager and all round “ chieftan of the proletarian elite 
in the garment industry.”69  Dubinsky emerged as an impressive leader for the Socialists 
in their campaign against the Communists during the 1926-1927 struggles, and would 
eventually become the ILGWU President in 1932 – a position he would hold until 1966.  
Like Hillman, Dubinsky tolerated the organized crime infiltration of ILG‟s unions up 
until a certain point. However, in surveying various historical accounts it is clear 




By all accounts, Lepke Buchalter had effectively infiltrated the New York 
garment industry for several years after the unrelated deaths of Arnold Rothstein and 
Little Auggie.  In this light, one cannot help but be both amazed and shocked in reading 
David Dubinsky‟s memoir A Life With Labor. The opening sentence of Dubinsky‟s 
chapter on gangsterism in the labor unions boldly states, “Racketeering is the cancer that 
almost destroyed the American trade union movement.”71  However, after briefly 
discussing a racketeering incident in 1925, Dubinsky abruptly skips ahead to 1947, 
bypassing 22 years of union history!  Dubinsky has the privilege to take such an 
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extraordinary leap in time due to the history of racketeering in the sector of the garment 
industry he was responsible for leading.  The nature of organized crime infiltration was 
mainly of the „backroom deals‟ and unspoken agreements between manufacturers and 
racketeers.  However, the shadowy world of racketeering in the women‟s wear industry 
was fully exposed with the arrest of garment manufacturer Benjamin Levine.  On 
February 10, 1938, District Attorney Thomas Dewey charged Levine for acting as the 
„principal conduit‟ through which money collected from garment manufacturers was 
distributed to Lepke and Gurrah.  Levine ascended to the highest ranks of the racket in 
1933, revealing the long-term, entrenched positions Lepke and Gurrah were able to 
secure in women‟s wear.  It is hard to believe over the course of these 5 years that 
Dubinsky was in the dark about Lepke‟s role behind the protective.72   
In the main, Lepke‟s activities in the women‟s wear industry came primarily from 
payoffs handed to him by manufacturing protective associations for his role in keeping 
smaller shops from undercutting larger manufacturing firms.  Dubinsky was willing to 
tolerate the arrangement, always preferring to avoid confrontations in order to maintain 
stability and growth.  Perhaps, the most precise summation of David Dubinsky‟s 
relationship with organized crime comes from a lecture delivered by Thomas Dewey 
when he revealed, “ I met with David Dubinsky and Sidney Hillman regularly throughout 
1936…I knew they were involved with gangsters, but they wouldn‟t speak…they 
wouldn‟t budge”.73  Dewey‟s quote best exemplifies Dubinsky‟s history with organized 
crime; always keeping a safe distance, yet never mobilizing the rank-and-file to drive 
gangster elements out of the industry.  It is important to note that Dubinsky‟s 
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unwillingness to cooperate with Dewey on labor racketeering did not come from a moral 
stance of abstaining from working with the government due to some kind of socialistic, 
anti-capitalist ethic.  In fact, Dubinsky worked fairly regularly and openly with American 
politicians such as Senators Hubert Humphrey and Herbert Lehman to eradicate any 
Communist influence in the American trade union movement.
74
  
Overall, the historiography concerning Dubinsky and Hillman can be divided into 
two periods: the first being the early biographies that glorified their heroic struggles 
against labor racketeering in the service of American workers, while the second phase of 
scholarship can be characterized by its „defensive rationalizations‟ of labor‟s alliance 
with organized crime.  Confronted with the overwhelming amount of evidence linking 
Sidney Hillman with the criminal underworld, historians such as Stephen Fraser and 
Albert Fried, chalk up Hillman‟s long-term association with labor racketeers to the larger 
forces at play.
75
  Albert Fried concludes, 
We can agree that Lepke maintained his considerable strength in the 
men‟s clothing industry and his extensive connections with the  
Amalgamated Clothing Workers, even its leadership.  We can also agree 
that there was nothing devilishly sinister in those connections…nothing 
sinister in the fact that the union had to acknowledge the enormity of 
Lepke‟s presence and in so doing turn it to their own best advantage.76 
 
With this largely determinist summation, using the extreme criteria of “devilishly 
sinister” to assess Hillman‟s connections to organized crime, Fried dishonestly excludes 
Lepke‟s well-documented history of strike-breaking, shakedowns, and rank-and-file 
extortion from his overall summation.  Perhaps if we were limited to the history of the 
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textile industries within the Garment District, the rationalizations for labor‟s complicity 
with gangsters like Lepke would possess a certain amount of credibility. However, as we 
turn our attention to the fur industry, the Communist-led International Union‟s ability to 
confront and overpower “ the enormity of Lepke‟s presence” serves as a powerful 
counterargument to both Fried‟s and Fraser‟s determinist rationalizations. 
Furriers’ Fury 
 New York‟s Fur Industry, a subsection within the larger Garment District located 




 streets, shared the basic conditions and 
characteristics of the textile industries: dominated by highly-competitive, small shops; 
unstable, seasonal work; a workforce mainly constituted of Jewish immigrants; a fierce, 
long-standing struggle between right-wing Socialists and left-wing Communists; and the 
presence of the Jewish criminals within the union and the manufacturer associations.  A 
key factor that set the New York fur industry apart from the other industries in the 
Garment District was the successful 1926 Communist-led strike.  A year before the 1926 
furrier strike, the left-wing faction of the union had gained control over a majority of its 
locals.  The IFWU‟s president, Socialist Morris Kaufmann, refused to seek common 
ground with the left-wing section, led by Communist Ben Gold.  As a result, the 
Socialists established the Progressive Group, a faction within the Union that acted as the 
official affiliate to the AFL.  Similar to ILG leader David Dubinksy, the Socialist furriers 
mustered all of their resources to drive out any Communist influence within the Union 
and regain its leadership positions.  Perhaps hard to believe in today‟s political context, 
the Communists and the AFL-affiliated Socialist leadership were locked in an intense 
struggle, where both regarded each other as sworn enemies.   
 39 
This rivalry would take a qualitative leap during the Communist Third Period 
(1928-1935) when the Comintern ordered all of its parties to adopt an ultra-left program, 
leading to the establishment of Communist dual-unions and the identification of 
Socialists and Social-Democratic parties as “social-fascists”.  Conversely, the Socialists 
and major AFL leaders viewed the Communist-dominated IFWU as their largest obstacle 
in cleansing the American trade union movement of subversive, Communist influence.  
Matthew Woll, vice president of the AFL, made his views on the matter perfectly clear 
when he publically stated, “ We must not remain silent…We must crush the Communist 
fortress in the Furriers Union and chase out all the Moscow agents from all the unions.  
We must protect our blessed democratic freedoms from the Communist conspiracy.”77  
Irving Howe‟s fitting use of Melech Epstein‟s account of the “ civil war between factions 
that began to resemble gang war”78 vividly captures the extreme nature of the fighting: 
Vicious fights on the picket lines, in the shops, and on the streets were a daily  
occurrence.  Few weeks passed when workers, slashed with knives of their trade 





It was this bitter rivalry, accompanied by the common practice of hiring out criminal 
elements, which set the stage for a series of violent episodes that spilled out on the streets 
of the Garment District throughout the Great Depression. 
 In surveying a majority of the literature on labor racketeering, it can be said with 
very little hesitation that Ben Gold consistently led his rank-and-file to confront, resist, 
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and drive out criminal racketeers from the International Union.
80
 The first phase of 
struggles took the form of street battles with labor-sluggers hired by the AFL in order to 
disrupt various labor strikes.  The second phase of resistance to the criminal underworld 
came in a violent struggle against Lepke Buchalter.  In Ben Gold‟s Memoirs, he details 
three different encounters with strike-breaking gangs between 1927 and 1930: the 
Frenchie Gang, the Shapiro Gang, and the Soldier Bartfiled Gang.
81
  The strikes in which 
all three of these cases occurred were the result of the Communist-led union protesting 
the Socialist-AFL‟s efforts to force manufacturers to only hire AFL union workers.  In all 
three of these cases, furrier workers were mobilized into red “defense committees” to 
protect the pickets from gangster attacks, as opposed to the Communists hiring out 
another gang of labor-sluggers as was done in the dressmakers‟ strike.  The development 
of the defense committees are significant in that they show a political leadership 
consciously deciding to rely on, and mobilize, the workers they claimed to represent.  
This also gave them the ability to circumvent the more traditional model of hiring 
gangsters, a strategy that often left unions more vulnerable to criminal infiltration.  
Although Gold‟s Memoirs are predictably biased in certain respects, they remain a 
valuable resource in providing a rare glimpse into the actual struggles that unions had to 
undertake in order to overcome and expel a formidable force.  Gold describes the first 
attack of the Frenchie Gang against a picket line: 
The Frenchie gangsters, after surveying the battlefield thoroughly, used careful 
methods.  They waited until the workers were inside the shops at work and the 
mass of unemployed workers‟ ranks had thinned out after 1 PM…Then the 
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gangsters of the right-wing furriers union attacked the strikers, beat them up with 
steel pipes and ran as from a fire…82  
 
The response of the union was as follows: 
In order to protect the workers from any more such attacks…we organized a 
defense committee from among the members of the Union…In one week‟s time, 
over a hundred workers pledged to protect the strikers…We divided our defense 
committee into four groups to be positioned in four different locations…After one 
o‟clock, a large gang of gangsters attacked the pickets in only one place.  When 
the shouts of “Gangsters! Gangsters! Were heard all over Seventh Avenue, the 
unemployed workers surrounded the gangsters and helped the pickets “argue 
things out” with them.83  
 
Gold goes on to write: 
Suddenly, they saw a group of gangsters rush out of their hiding places and attack 
the outer side of the ring of pickets.  The workers were helpless and defenseless, 
with no possible way of escaping from the gangsters‟ fists, which were 
hammering their bodies…In a matter of a few seconds, they (the defense 
committee) were hammering back at the gangsters.  There were eight gangsters 
and forty enraged workers of the defense committees…not one of the gangsters 




This scenario played out again only a few months later, however, this time with a gang 
led by the Shapiro brothers.
85
  By 1929 the CP furriers, along with the left-wing factions 
from the textile and hat industries, had severed whatever few remaining ties they had 
with the right-wing Socialists in the IFWU to form the explicitly Communist dual-union 
NTWIU (literature concerning the NTWIU in the fur industry commonly refers to it as 
the Industrial Union).  Later that year, an ad-hoc defense committee was successful in 
foiling an attempt by the Soldier Bartfield gang to ambush and attack Communist leaders 
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in their new headquarters.
86
  The confrontations of this time period were carried out with 
brute, primitive force by small-time labor sluggers contracted by rival right-wing union 
officials.  Incident after incident reveals a consistent pattern common to the archaic labor-
slugger era, however, the mobilization of the rank-and-file into defense committees 
remains an important exception to the rule – an exception that would prove to be 
incredibly valuable as Lepke began to set his sights on the fur industry.  
 Louis Buchalter and Jacob Shapiro‟s careers in the fur industry began in April 
1932 and ended in the summer of 1933.
87
  The main individual responsible for the 
bringing Lepke gang into the fur industry was none other than Abraham Beckerman.  
Beckerman joined with former IFWU president Morris Kaufman to create the Fur 
Dressers Fur Corporation in 1932 after he was expelled from Hillman‟s Amalgamated 
Union.  This cartel, along with Protective Fur Dressers Corporation, was made up of the 
63 largest fur-dressing companies.  Recounting his career in Amalgamated, Beckerman 
told FBI agents, "For about one and one-half years previously, I had been personally 
acquainted with Louis Buchalter and Jacob Shapiro.”88   Beckerman would turn to the 
Lepke-Shapiro gang when he entered the fur industry, stating, “I called one of them on 
the telephone and went up to see them. I explained that there was a certain amount of 
organization work, meaning rough stuff, that would have to be done and inquired whether 
they were in a position to undertake it . . . They told me that they would take care of 
me."
89
  Behind Beckerman‟s tactful use of the euphemistically dubbed “organization 
work”, existed the reality of 12 assaults, 10 bombings, 1 kidnapping, 3 acid throwings, 2 
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cases of arson, and dozens of telephone threats.
90
  Labor historian Phillip S. Foner asserts 
that Lepke and Gurrah offered the Industrial Union a set of concessions for the workers 
in the form of wage increases in exchange for their complicity and occasionally enforcing 
a strike when necessary… the Industrial Union refused.91  With Gold‟s furrier union 
remaining free of any major criminal presence, the conflict between the Industrial Union 
and Lepke would eventually arise out differences over decisions regarding the 
manufacturer protectives. 
 As previously discussed, union leader Morris Langer was murdered as a result of 
his refusal to call for strikes against a fur shop that was operating out of compliance with 
the fur protectives.  Despite the extreme measures taken by Lepke to intimidate the union, 
the union leadership refused to capitulate following Langer‟s death and the workers 
remained in the shop.  Tensions between Gold‟s Industrial Union and Lepke would reach 
a violent climax on the morning of April 24
th
, 1933.  The mob violence and street melee 
that broke out in the Union‟s headquarters on West 28th street has become one of the 
most widely documented confrontations between organized labor and organized crime in 
New York history.  FBI investigations indicate that Lepke maintained a hotel suite in the 
vicinity of the Garment District where a meeting was held with a group of gangsters who 
were instructed to “raid the left wing headquarters” and were “ furnished with steel pipes 
wrapped in newspapers and guns.”92  At 10 am Lepke‟s crew invaded the second floor of 
the NTWIU headquarters and began to beat union members with steel pipes.
93
  Ben Gold 
was leading a meeting on the fourth floor when shots began to be fired on the second 
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floor, specifically targeting the office of union leader Jack Schneider.
94
  After the initial 
shock of the raid wore off, the furriers began to collectively fight back against the assault.  
In addition, hundreds of furriers spontaneously began to stream out of their shops (many 
still clutching their knives and cutting tools) and poured into the Union‟s headquarters.95  
In all of the chaos, the gangsters began firing on people indiscriminately, presumably out 
of fear and as a means to escape from the crowds of angry workers.  When the police 
finally regained control in the Garment District, 15 workers were found seriously injured, 
one worker had been shot to death, and another seriously wounded by gunfire (the second 
victim, Harry Gottfried, would later die from his stomach wound).
96
  Photos in the New 
York Times displayed six unconscious gangsters lying on the sidewalk, badly cut-up and 
severely wounded from the crowd of workers.
97
  In addition, two workers were shot to 
death – one by a stray bullet, the other by a police officer.   
 A majority of historians mark this incident as the final blow against Lepke in the 
fur industry.
99
  While it can be agreed that the April 24
th
 raid represented a decisive 
turning point for labor racketeering in the fur industry, it was most certainly not the last 
battle in the furriers‟ struggle to rid the union of labor racketeers.  The Communists 
seized on the momentum produced by the April 24
th
 battle and went on the offensive 
against Lepke-Gurrah.  In a sense, the gauntlet was thrown down and the future of the 
Industrial Union would pivot on the events in the aftermath of the raid.  As a result a 
concerted effort by the International Union, accompanied by the public release of various 
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crimes committed in the fur industry, Abraham Beckerman and four other protective 
associates were arrested for price fixing.  Hundreds of thousands of flyers, pamphlets, 
and press releases were distributed by the Industrial Union at demonstrations, public 
meetings, and busy street corners listing the names and crimes of known racketeers.  The 
NTWIU called for a mass demonstration against racketeering on May 13
th
 in New York‟s 
Union Square with flyer that read, “ Let Us Take up the Struggle to Drive the Racketeers 
and Gangsters from the Needle Trades Industry”.100 Throughout the period of exposing 
underworld racketeers a special defense corps was created to protect union headquarters 
and leaders.  By the end summer of 1933 Lepke had in fact given up on expanding his 
empire into the fur industry.  A few years later, NTWIU furriers Irving Potash and 
Samuel Burt would be the only witnesses ever to come forward and specifically name 
Lepke and Gurrah under sworn testimony.  After the trial, even mainstream press outlets 
such as the New York Post reported, “Lepke and Gurrah were convicted of racketeering 
in the rabbit skin industry largely based on the testimony of Irving Potash…and Samuel 
Burt.”101   
 After looking at the three main industries in New York‟s needle-trades (men‟s 
wear, women‟s wear, fur), it is important to delineate how the leadership of each union 
dealt with racketeers when faced with a decisive moment of direct confrontation and 
upheaval.  Sidney Hillman took a firm, public stance against the criminal underworld in 
the trade union movement, however was willing to tolerate its existence so long as it 
helped serve his interests.  His anti-racketeering campaign in the summer of 1932 did in 
fact mobilize the rank-and-file to confront Lepke‟s might.  Tens of thousands of workers 
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flooded the streets of the Garment District with picket signs declaring “ Down with 
Gangdom”, and suffered physical attacks (including one murder) as they consciously 
fought against the presence of racketeers in the Garment District.  However, after the tide 
subsided and Lepke‟s functionaries were removed from the cutters‟ local, Hillman slowly 
regressed back into business-as-usual.  Despite his anti-racketeering posture, his 
unwillingness to intensify the struggle against racketeers after making an initial gain in 
1932 reveals where he truly stood on the question of “gangdom” in the Garment District.   
 A larger, more comprehensive biographical account of Hillman and Dubinsky 
does in fact show both to be powerful leaders who contributed a great deal to the 
American labor movement; whether it being their roles in elevating garment workers out 
of the highly exploitive, sweatshop industry or public figures who put labor‟s struggles 
for economic justice in the national spotlight.  Despite Hillman‟s and Dubinsky‟s gradual 
turn toward more conservative positions as their careers grew, both men remained 
committed to improving the conditions of workers who held the very same positions they 
held when they themselves were new immigrants, making ends meet as shop workers in 
the garment industry.  However, when it came to labor racketeering, both Hillman and 
Dubinksy formed a discreet alliance with very same underworld forces that were 
responsible for breaking up strikes and assassinating labor organizers.   
All of this stands in marked contrast to Ben Gold‟s leadership in the fur industry.  
In the aftermath of Lepke‟s unsuccessful attempt to drive the Communist leadership of 
the International Union out of the fur industry, the Union mobilized its entire membership 
to expose and eradicate Lepke‟s crime syndicate from the industry.  Clearly, the 
Communist Party was not free of collaborating with labor sluggers and underworld 
 47 
figures, as witnessed in the historic 1926 dressmakers‟ strike.  However, in surveying the 
Garment District‟s history over the course of the 1920s and 1930s, it becomes apparent 
that Communist collaboration with labor racketeers was something of an anomaly, as 
opposed to long-standing relationship.  For instance, prior to the 1926 dressmakers‟ strike 
the CP took a firm stance against cooperating with underworld „strong-arm men‟.  
Charles S. Zimmerman, who in 1925 was still a leader in the CP‟s ILGWU Joint Board, 
refused to stop a strike at the Roth Costume Company after several „hired goons‟ gave 
him an ultimatum of: stop the strike or lose your life. A few days later Zimmerman was 
enjoying a walk with his wife on an autumn day along 25
th
 street when a group of men 
attacked him in front of clothes store, beating him so badly he was sent to the hospital for 
days.
102
 In the aftermath of the 1926 CP-led strike, articles in the Daily Worker took a 
firm stance against racketeering, with virtually no mention of any serious Communist-
racketeer collaboration in the Garment District in the historic literature on the subject.
103
   
The CP‟s decision-making process and justifications for utilizing Little Augie 
during the 1926 strike remain in the realm of speculation.  Ben Gold‟s Memoirs and 
Philip S. Foner‟s series on The History of the Labor Movement in the United States 
dishonestly make no mention of Little Augie‟s lengthy employment by the CP during the 
strike.  David Dubinsky‟s memoirs only shed light on the cast of characters and 
chronology of the strike, as the CP mainly kept Dubinsky in the dark about the inner 
details of the strike.  Perhaps it can be said that the magnitude of the stakes involved with 
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the 1926 dressmakers‟ strike prompted the CP to hire Little Augie as a necessary measure 
to assure that pickets would remain in the street.  Later writings in the Daily Worker 
provide little insight into the CP‟s view of labor racketeers other than the fact that 
racketeers were „lackeys for the capitalist class‟ and „enemies of the workers‟.   
Undercurrents 
 Although the Garment District produced a complex array of contradictory figures 
and political organizations, one can begin to form a sense of coherency when assessing 
the degree of pragmatism exhibited by this assortment of union leaders in relation to their 
history with organized crime.  In addition, there was a mutually reinforcing relationship 
between the philosophical currents of pragmatism and the political strategies employed 
by union leaders.  Before proceeding to examine the philosophical underpinnings of 
organized labor‟s relationship to organized crime during this time period it is important to 
take note of a key factor in the realm of politics.  This political factor can be found most 
clearly expressed in the events surrounding the deterioration between Sidney Hillman and 
the Communist Party in 1924.  Hillman and the CP had a much publicized falling out 
over the question of supporting Robert La Follette Sr.‟s candidacy for President.  
However, in addition to the La Follette issue, Hillman and the CP had two very different 
views on how to approach labor organizing in general.  Hillman wholeheartedly believed 
the best way to gain workers‟ rights and labor reforms was through the stabilization and 
improvement of the industry in which the rank-and-file labored.
104
  The CP took an 
entirely different approach to trade union organizing, based on their summation that 
workers‟ would be in a stronger position to have their demands met the weaker the 
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industry became through a combination of capitalist crises and militant, union organizing.  
Clearly, there is a direct connection between both respective positions and their views on 
the question of revolution versus reform.   
However, in returning back to the main question at hand, Hillman‟s general 
political strategy of improving the industry as a means of improving the workers‟ 
conditions was a factor in laying the basis for Hillman to open up his door to labor 
sluggers and criminal syndicates.  The elimination of small shop competition and creation 
of a fixed-price system brought about by the protectives that Lepke and Gurrah had a 
major part in establishing, presented an advantageous arrangement for Hillman‟s pursuit 
of stability and union growth.  However, with the successful effects of the NIRA negating 
the need for industry protectives, Hillman‟s continued use of criminals like Lepke in the 
mid-1930s point to a union leader who grew accustomed to the “convenience” of 
racketeers, moving even further beyond any ethical or political justification for 
collaborating with the underworld.  As part of synthesizing the political patterns and 
trends of the multiple unions in the Garment District, it is helpful to echo the point 
previously made by historian Alan Block that: the more radical the union, the less likely 
it is to be infiltrated by organized crime.
105
   
The „practical minds‟ of leaders like Sidney Hillman and the old guard Socialists 
whose conservatism grew in tandem with their power in the labor movement discarded 
any import placed on political theory.  The abstract character of theory (or political 
theory) that tends to be more universalistic, especially within a leftwing Marxist 
movement, could have potentially prevented or limited their dealings with the underworld 
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instead of the short-sighted, „by any means necessary‟ approach that was marked by 
quintessential, pragmatic thought.  With pragmatism‟s central tenant being “that the 
meaning of a concept is given by its practical utility and nothing else”,106 this unofficial 
principle would have a considerable impact on progressive and radical movements 
throughout American history.  
Along with the popular place that pragmatism has occupied in American culture 
generally; Debsian-era Socialist intellectuals like Max Eastman
107
 and Morris Hillquit
108
 
had a direct connection with influencing and creating a precedent for the incorporation of 
pragmatic thought within the New York labor movement. As Hillquit‟s general political 
orientation of putting the practical, day-to-day struggles over the potentially divisive 
theoretical issues was adopted by the likes of Dubinsky and Hillman, the extra „muscle‟ 
brought in by racketeers appeared as a viable, effective tool in making immediate gains.  
As Hillman‟s early biographer Peterson wrote, “To describe Hillman's thinking as either 
conservative or radical was fallacious then, as later. He was, by disposition, not an 
ideologist, but a realist (in John Dewey's sense of the word)”.109 When asked to comment 
on ideological quarrels in the Socialist movement Hillman responded, “Bah, they sound 
like the French Revolution of 1848, but this is America in 1928!"
110 
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 However, despite the assuredness of Hillman‟s claims, the America of 1928 was 
not one in the same as the Garment District of 1928.  The Garment District of the 1920s 
was a convergence point for Jews from the extinct Russian empire forging new lives in 
the emerging American empire.  Throughout the streets and factories of New York, many 
of them brought the ideals of Marxism and revolution from the distant lands that would 
eventually become part of the Soviet empire.  Whether the immigrants were simply poor, 
dispossessed families leaving the peasant villages or shtetls of Czarist Russia (as most of 
them were) or part of the generation of European Jews who were swept up in the 
revolutionary upheavals of early 20
th
 century Russia, there was the sobering experience 
brought on by the „new world‟ upon arriving in New York.  America‟s developed 
industrial capitalist economy; its chaotic, fast-paced commerce surging throughout the 
Garment District, also swept up the hundreds of thousands of Jewish immigrants into the 
modern urban world of overcrowded slums, factory life, and the realities of interacting 
and contending with immigrants from other countries.  Along with the new opportunities 
found in education and labor, there were also new opportunities found in vice.  Unlike the 
Italians, Jews did not arrive in America with a historically developed crime network.  The 
Jewish mobster is a distinctly American creation.  With no traditional ties to the past, he 
was free to fully embrace and embody the very ethos of capitalistic America.  The ideals 
and struggles of his fellow brethren fell on deaf ears as he ambitiously fought his way out 
of the ghetto- no matter what the cost.  Objectively, however, there was a cost; the 
countless amount of workers intimidated, beaten, and murdered by underworld gangsters 
represents a living testament to the essential nature of the criminal class profiting from 
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